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Abstract
Authenticity is a difficult and taxing notion in both the digital and the analogue
world. It is a retrospective and by implication dynamic notion, a reaction to whether
or not we are dealing with the genuine article, that an object is what it purports to
be at a moment in time and its content can be validated using available technology.
It is not an end in itself like a fresh herring, but a red herring which, because of
the pungent smell of the smokehouse, can put the hounds off the scent. Moreover
it is not an absolute: an object that might appear perfectly authentic from one
perspective may be considered to lack sufficient tokens of authenticity in another,
and may later from both viewpoints be considered invalid.
Content change may be captured in technologies, but does it necessarily fol-
low that the intellectual content remains the same? Revolutions in technology may
change the ‘container’ (for example a card catalogue becomes a database), but how
do such migrations affect content and the procedures and practices that surround it?
Is entering entities in a database the same as filling in cards? Distribution channels
have always influenced structure and form without necessarily changing intellectual
content or associated practice. In addressing such issues we warn against the ever
present danger of a collapse into technological determinism with an accompanying
utopian optimism [12].
We propose that discussion of identity needs to shift away from discussion of
technologies for preserving information towards characterisation of the persistent
intellectual content. In the migration to the digital we are especially concerned with
four separate but related issues of identity from this perspective:
• functionally identical replicas
• superficially identical replicas
• similar objects
• earlier/later versions
We conclude that identity is not a technical issue: notions of identity, like authen-
ticity, are dynamic and have to deal with the non-transitive relations in stages of
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documents and objects. We are convinced that only by adopting such a stance can
any progress be made in the sterile debate about digital preservation which logically
must be downstream from the resolution of notions of authenticity that themselves
are reactive to issues of intellectual content and available technology that following
Aristotle we characterise as techne´.
Key words:
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1 Introduction
Information objects serve a variety of purposes: as vehicles of communication,
to seal agreements or contracts, for entertainment, persuasion, education and
as repositories of artistic or intellectual endeavour. As a result they can be
expected to have different characteristics. Any meaningful discussion of such
objects therefore requires agreement as to which type of object is being con-
sidered so that the notion of identity can be thoroughly explored. The notion
of identity in this context is important in relation to the sameness of such
objects in time or place and also across the panoply of relationships that such
objects can have to one another. This paper, like most other information ob-
jects, has a range of relationships to other papers, quoting from some, referring
to others, agreeing with one, disagreeing with another and finally building on
an earlier paper in which we first discussed the subject [1].
In trying to shed light on this area, we must consider why identity is important
in an intellectual sense. Then we need to separate this quest for identity from
a simplistic consideration of the (mainly technical) means by which we can
determine objectively whether or not two information objects are the same.
We soon discover that this task is by no means straightforward, with notions
of version, rendition and performance all nuancing identity. 1 However, none
of these notions are new in the digital world; our starting point must be to
consider how identity is understood in the analogue world and then consider
how migration to a digital world alters the way that we deal with the identity
of information objects.
1 Between us we produced no fewer that 19 versions of this paper before we arrived
at the version that you are reading.
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2 Content
The notion of content that we consider an object, text or event to contain
or convey is neither singular nor immutable; at least, this is the conception
following a writer such as Barthes [3]. The polysemy, or plurality of meaning,
advocated by Barthes is a conception with which we have some sympathy, but
which must be balanced by an exploration of the intention of the author or
creator which may or may not have implications in any future retrospective
discussion of authenticity. We can agree, for example that ‘The Haywain’ was
painted by Constable, but we do not need to know what his intentions were
in creating the work in order to appreciate the painting; whereas if we are
beneficiaries we are very keen to learn what Aunt Gertrude intended when
she left us her bantam cocks. On the other hand a third party reading Aunt
Gertrude’s will may have no interest in such intentionality and only be inter-
ested in the fact that by committing her soul to God with the protection of
the Blessed Virgin Mary and all the saints, she had Catholic tendencies.
As these trivial examples suggest, ‘content’ can refer to the meaning that
something expresses, or to its information content, or to the constituents of
an individual’s experience at any given moment: for example, marvelling at
‘The Haywain’ or being left bantam cocks. In the latter case the content is
singular and fixed, but it is also private, subjective and, interestingly, immune
from error through misidentification [34,10]. I cannot be wrong about who
it is who is having the experience or, for that matter, what I believe to be
the content of that experience, and what I believe to be the content of my
experience is of little public concern unless my content is such that I am
moved to act on it in a bizarre or threatening manner. It is with content as
meaning and content as information that we are concerned in the context
of objects that are external though, of course, they cannot but relate to the
individual’s experience for things have content in virtue of their having a value
of some sort for the experiencer or reader; ‘The Haywain’ would have no value
if no one had ever seen it.
In his analysis of meaning or content Frege [13] distinguishes between the two
ways in which an expression can have significance. The first is its sense, the
way in which the term or text refers to the object; also known as its ’mode
of presentation’, which is to say, the thought that it expresses. The second is
its reference, that is, the identifier, proper name or term used to refer to the
object. So, if we take, for example,Mona Lisa, we have a term that refers, picks
out, or identifies a particular work of art, but we also know that its a whole
lot more than that. We might know, for example, that it refers to a painting
by Leonardo Da Vinci, that it was painted during the period now known as
the Italian renaissance, that it has the alternative title: “La Gioconda (La
Joconde)”, or even that it has the title “Portrait of Lisa Gherardini, wife of
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Francesco del Giocondo”, where it hangs in the Muse´e du Louvre in Paris,
and so on. The name, the text or term, has many ways in which it refers to
the object and not just that it means Mona Lisa and nothing more. It is in
Frege’s groundbreaking work that we can begin to see Barthes’ polysemy take
shape. As we have suggested, we do not need to know any of this reference
detail to appreciate the painting; a simple catalogue reference can suffice.
On the River Clyde ‘Ship No. 534 at the John Brown yard’ is just as an
evocative reference as the Cunard liner’s name Queen Mary. Such semantic
reference conveys many more embedded concepts of identity than any amount
of technical detail, the size and weight of the ‘Mona Lisa’ or the Queen Mary.
In much the same way the technical, as opposed to semantic, attributes of
digital objects may provide clues to provenance and any changes that may
have occurred, but little else. However, we would not wish to reject the latter
in favour of the former; they both represent essential characteristics in defining
the identity of the objects to which they refer. Setting the technical and the
semantic up in a binary opposition of this kind can be what forms the greatest
obstacle to resolving the debates within the digital environment; one way out
of this morass would be to reconsider them within an Aristotelian framework
of techne´, pra¯xis, and episteˆmeˆ, where each is employed alongside the other in
an attempt to discover truth.
Aristotle [2] describes techne´ as the disposition by which something is brought
about using true-reasoning from the appropriate principles which have been
acquired through experience. Techne´ is an art or technical skill: “the pro-
ductive state that is truly reasoned, while its contrary non-art [atechnia] is
a productive state that is falsely reasoned” [2, 1140a1-23]. Thus, all activity,
whether science or humanity is, ideally, both rational and productive. Pra¯xis,
on the other hand, is to do with purposive conduct, and most particularly
with the exercise of phronesis or practical wisdom and the search for truth
(virtue) and falsity (vice) in relation to correct desire and, thus, (moral) ac-
tion. Both techne´ and pra¯xis can be distinguished from episteˆmeˆ which refers
to the theoretical underpinning of scientific enquiry where “the object of sci-
entific knowledge is of necessity” [2, 113918-36], that is, (controversially for
our age and reason) there are no conditions under which it could be otherwise.
Aristotle’s favoured examples are taken from geometry, but there are many
and they also include medical and general science. So, if episteˆmeˆ directs it-
self towards the discovery of truth, techne´ to its production, and pra¯xis to its
employment, we can begin to see a way in which the technical and semantic
should function together to be truth-preserving, if not truth-determining. In
this way we can begin to see how Heidegger and Foucault’s use of techne´ as
aleˆtheuein, or truth-framing, takes shape.
If we are to make progress we need, perhaps, to start looking in the direction of
such mechanisms for what we could call ‘intellectual’ identity. What differences
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are ‘significant’ in an intellectual sense as opposed to a purely technical sense?
This takes us nearer Heidegger and Foucault’s use of the word technology or
techne´ to mean a mode of aleˆtheuein, by ‘enframing’; ‘It reveals whatever
does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can
look and turn out now one way and now another’ [20]. Foucault argues that
every technology implies a domain of knowledge and truth, and as a result
technology and power become inseparable. For McLuhan the medium itself
becomes the message. We may not wish to go so far, but we will explore the
complex relationship between technology and episteˆmeˆ in the digital world
avoiding the binary opposition between the technical and the semantic where,
as we have suggested, much of the difficulty lies. Kuhn coined the concept of a
‘paradigm shift’, much cited in the context of the information revolution [21],
but ‘only rarely does Kuhn recognise the crucial role a new piece of apparatus
may play as the prelude’ to such an event [18, pg. 46].
Such an approach refuses to privilege the technical because it is easy and
‘objective’ and appears to avoid difficult questions, but instead embraces the
semantic and intellectual as well. In both the analogue and digital worlds, dif-
ferent technologies can reveal different information from the same carrier. 2 In
a digital environment, if we take a technical only view, it becomes very difficult
to deal with the migration of digital objects to different systems and technolo-
gies in any reliable way, except to make ever more unsupportable assertions
about technical processes, such as increasing the complexity of passwords,
adoption of digital signatures, checksums, and so forth [16, pg. 50] [39, pg. 24]
and leads to the approach of Gladney who states that ‘Where information is
cryptographically packaged together with its own provenance assertion, and
this evidence shows itself to be intact, a consumer can be confident that the
information is authentic’ [15]. Let us take an example of where this might fail
- if a Microsoft Word file has been read into Open Office and saved as an
OpenXML file, is it the same abstract object? There are a number of issues
even in this rather trivial example:
• there may be features of the layout that are not faithfully migrated and
which are an important part of the intellectual identity of the object; for
example in George Herbert’s poem ‘Easter Wings’ of 1633, 3 layout is ar-
guably as important as the words used, or in the case of the Mona Lisa the
size, shape and texture are critical and can hardly be replicated on a biscuit
tin let alone on screen.
2 Many of us, as children, will have experimented with ‘hidden writing’ using, for
instance, onion juice. More topically, developments in DNA profiling (DNA LCN
or DNA low copy number) allow evidence to be extracted from materials which
previously were not thought to have sufficient cells for this. [14]
3 A representation of this poem may be found at: http://www.luminarium.org/
sevenlit/herbert/wings.htm
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• there may be behaviours coded in macros that, under the translation, work
quite differently (or not at all), in the same way as brush strokes or the
texture of parchment vanish or are transformed in digital renditions.
• the file may not be completely self contained in either environment and rely
on system settings that do not form part of the transformation or an explicit
part of the file in either case. The conversion process is analogous to tearing
a physical object from its intended setting, for example the removal of the
‘Elgin Marbles’ from the Parthenon.
3 Binding and its Importance
In the analogue, the identity of any documentary object and its place in a
collection is warranted by attributes that can be characterised as bindings that
will vary depending on the ‘value’ which is attributed to it by the responsible
individual or organisation. Such bindings are the subject of ‘diplomatics’,
. . . the study of the Wesen [being] and Werden [becoming] of documenta-
tion, the analysis of genesis, inner constitution and transmission of docu-
ments, and of their relationship with the facts represented in them and with
their creators. [9, pg. 7] 4
From a diplomatic perspective, the ‘form of a document is of course both
physical [technical] and intellectual’ [9, pg. 15]. Originally confined to juridical
documents with necessarily unambiguous form and structure, ‘diplomatics’
has come to have a much wider application which still implies a set of all
embracing rules. For this reason we prefer to use the less prescriptive term
‘binding’. In the analogue, bindings were obvious manifestations: the letters
from a lover bound together with a garter, a bundle of receipts neatly docketed
and tied with lawyer’s tape, a label attached to a museum exhibit, an album of
photographs or a royal charter with the great seal attached by silken cord. All
these disparate examples embody intentions and implicit or explicit rules and
relationships that can be described as ‘grammar’ in much the same way as the
syntax employed in the resource description framework (RDF) is described.
The process of attaching a royal seal or a label to a museum object is explicit
and surrounded by formal process, whereas tying a lover’s letter in a bundle
to define their physical relationship may be equally dignified but is implicit.
If the seal or label becomes detached or the garter is not retied then the value
derived from the binding is lost.
4 Duranti is quoting Giorgio Cencetti, “La Preparazione dell’Archivista” in An-
tologia di Scritti Archivistici, ed. Romualdo Giuffrida (Roma: Ministero per i beni
culturali e ambientali. Publicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, 1985), p. 285.
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The grammar of binding in the analogue is complex and represents centuries of
accumulated experience and technologies. A letter has a form and process that
dates back hundreds of years, which like all other information objects is always
viewed in the present through the lens of available technology: the quill pen,
the camera, the typewriter, the PC and so on [24]. We were taught at school or
in the Brownies how a letter should be laid out, with at the top the addresses
of the sender and recipient along with the date, appropriate salutation (Dear
Sir, My Love and so on), valediction (I remain your Lordship’s humble servant,
yours sincerely and so on), and the name and office, where appropriate, of the
writer. If you are of our sort of generation, you learned to do this with a pen,
even a dip pen, and ink on a piece of paper and woe betide you if you made
splodges. From at least the seventeenth century there were guidebooks not
just about the physical activity of writing itself and the layout of letters, but
also about the appropriate style of language and vocabulary to be used in
different contexts. [26]
Letters were finally authenticated with the sender’s signature - a signature
which can take a variety of forms depending on the nature of the contents,
and is extremely difficult to forge. Where a letter was written out by a scribe,
the author would conventionally endorse a signature with the initials mp - that
stands for the Latin tag ‘manu propria’ - signed in his own hand. If the writer
did not sign it then the scribe would write pp (standing for the Latin tag per
procurationem - through the agency of) before his/her signature. If the author
could not write then a mark was made that was attested by the scribe. Where a
letter or document required greater validation, signatures could be supported
by seals or by witnesses. Letters were often closed with the wax seal of the
sender or the sender’s office providing further validation and security that
after the introduction of postal services was supported externally by franking
to indicate the place and time of despatch. The evolution of pre-gummed
envelopes in the mid-nineteenth century obviated the need for sealing. To
provide even stronger binding, important documents that have a legal function
(a will or a contract or a land transaction for example) can be registered
externally with an individual or organisation with juridical authority, such
as a notary or the courts themselves, in which case they were expected to
respect particular forms that became the focus of ‘diplomatic’ study. Such
registration was often made explicit in the text of the document or through
endorsements such as notorial marks or an indication that duty had been paid
for registration.
4 Migration to the Digital
With the migration to the digital, several things have happened that com-
bine to disturb this relationship which depended on an equilibrium between
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content and context built up in the analogue over thousands of years, recog-
nising the ‘profound significance of communicative stability’ 5 . This context is
culturally specific, reflecting different epistemologies and circumstances. We
will suggest that this disruption may have significant consequences for social
interactions. Financial information systems were amongst the earliest to be
migrated, a process that predated the introduction of electronic computers.
One consequence was that instead of transactions being registered in a hi-
erarchy of records, that built for example the balance sheet and profit and
loss account incrementally, they were registered as individual entities that
could be linked to others through complex references that the software could
interpret to generate different aggregations for different reporting purposes.
Although they were still bound into a collection - essential for audit purposes,
the collection itself lacked the formal and familiar hierarchical structures of
the analogue and just subsisted in a database of individual transactions, in
other words the ‘functional equivalence’ of the analogue [8, pg. 80]. It is simple
to attribute this lack of structure to technical convenience, but a more con-
vincing explanation may be that the system built on the ideas of Luca Pacioli
(1445-1517) lacked his overall theoretical constructs that extended far beyond
accounting to embrace the relationship of ‘proportion’ to religion, medicine,
law, architecture, grammar, printing, sculpture, music and all the liberal arts.
Remarkably the terms that Pacioli conceived in his Devina Proportiona are
still used by the film industry to this day. [38, pg. 60]
When word processing became commonplace with the introduction of the
personal computer in the 1980s, other types of documentation, particularly
correspondence ceased to observe the form and structure of the analogue, and
their relationships often ceased to be made explicit within their form. It was
assumed incorrectly that the headers and footers of an e-mail provided ex-
ternally in the manner of a letterhead would be sufficient identification, even
though as most of us know in the analogue many letters are written on the
notepaper of other people or organisations. We have all scribbled notes on
hotel letterheads and used quite legitimately other people’s e-mail accounts
or used our business accounts for private transactions. As a result the roles
of senders and recipients became confused to any other than the parties to
a transaction and even to them might not be immediately obvious. In the
analogue, ‘Hi Michael’ implies a degree of informality that does not appear
to be the case of, for example, e-mail where perfect strangers often adopt this
form of salutation. It would be na¨ıve to suggest that such a change is entirely
a reflection of the migration to the digital. Styles of writing reflect social be-
haviour and are dynamic. The use of the valediction ‘I remain your obedient
servant’ had become archaic long before the introduction of the PC. What the
migration to the digital appears to have done is to accelerate the process. The
5 As emphasised by David Levy ‘The ability to keep talk fixed, to guarantee its
repeatability, has become an essential cornerstone of human social organisations’ [23]
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recent emergence of social networks, exposed to search engines with global
reach, like financial systems, raze epistemic hierarchies, and in turn reverse
McLuhan’s [25, pg. 46] claim that ‘it is the accumulation of group pressures
and irritations that prompt invention and innovation as counter-irritants’. In-
novation now appears to be exaptive, rather than an outcome of interactions
within epistemic communities, suggesting a disjunction. Companies like Ama-
zon.com say to us “Here it is, do with it as you please, but we will watch
you and give you extensions and other products that we judge match your
expectations”. It is here that technodeterminism is clearly at work.
The flattening of epistemic hierarchies is not just a consequence of the inter-
actions within social networks, but of the way in which information is both
aggregated and discovered. Digital objects that are not captured as part of
a formal process of audit (pretty much anything other than records of finan-
cial transactions or those required to satisfy regulation) have come to be only
loosely bound, if at all, into a collection even in an organisational context.
They are often held in so-called ‘files’ on PCs or in individuals’ email boxes
with no indication as to how they might relate to other documents to form a
collection. Together they can be described as a collection, but this would be a
very contingent use of the term that would cover the web pages that I happen
to have open at any one time in a browser. Alarmingly this state of affairs can
apply to important documents, such as the emails of the Prime Minister, [27]
as well as to those of private individuals. Digital objects in effect become stand
alone objects in an intellectual as well as a technical sense, randomly stored by
process and technology. When information is posted to social networks, this
has even more profound implications for the notion of a bounded collection
and the bindings that attach the information to an individual. The collection
that is Facebook is much more porous and fluid than an analogue equivalent
with very loose binding processes. It can easily be taken out of context or at-
tributed through comment and links to other perhaps inappropriate contexts.
Taken together all these changes in practice consequent of an unthinking mi-
gration to the digital raise fundamental questions about the nature of indi-
vidual identity in the digital world where virtual devils and angels abound in
an almost medieval cosmology. This of necessity has important consequences
when we seek to reference, authenticate or validate information in the digi-
tal environment. This ‘digital marination’ troubles Tara Brabazon [5, pg. 14],
‘Google has flattened expertise, creating confusion between finding informa-
tion and possessing the literacy to evaluate and judge information ... My fear
is not of wiki or Google. My concern is that in the confusion between finding
information and building knowledge, we lose not only the analogue objects and
artefacts, but analogue ways of thinking ... We have lost the capacity to value
the particular, the unique, the ephemeral and the transitory’. In other words
individual identity not just of objects, but the users of objects, themselves,
are being submerged in an undifferentiated morass.
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5 The Abstract Object and the Stored Bit Pattern
If we consider a digital ‘object’, what we are generally interested in is the
picture, the document, the song, the film, and so on, all of which we can
call abiding verities. We only become interested in the actual bit pattern
when there are questions around whether or not the item is what was seen
or heard before, deposited, exchanged between parties, and so on - in other
words doubts about authenticity. In many circumstances we are trying to get
technology to provide an answer to a question that is not philosophically a
technological question, at least not in the strict sense of the word [31, pg. 70].
The reason that we do this is because dates and times on files, number of
bytes, and other data that is generated ‘on the fly’ are very easy to find out
and compare and provide what appear to be straight-forward, unequivocal
‘black and white’ answers to what are complex issues that have troubled jurists
at least since the sixteenth century when the Donations of Constantine were
discovered to be a forgery [33, chapter IV]. We make the assumption that
if the bits are the same then the identity is the same and that all changes
to the bits constitute changes of substance. Neither of these assumptions is
wholly reliable, in exactly the same way that the shape and form of a physical
document is not an entirely reliable guide to either veracity or forgery.
We argued in our earlier article, ‘Digital Identity Matters’, [1] that when the
same bit pattern is sent through the rendering mechanisms on two computers,
there are many ways in which the perceived result may be different - thus
making the first assumption unreliable. As a relatively trivial but common
example of the second case, some copying processes change the date and time
on a file (information that is stored in the file itself), and by so doing change the
bit pattern stored. Many software environments treat date and time stamps
(date created, date last modified, date accessed and date printed) in a far from
robust way, making reliance on the stored bit pattern as a surrogate for identity
problematic. However, this does not mean they do not have reference. We can
observe the same phenomena in legal documents in the physical world where
the date and time is often the termination or filing of a process rather than the
date of its origination. For example, a will may be drawn up and witnessed long
before death and only registered with the appropriate authorities sometime
after death.
Does changing the file name of a digital object, without making any changes to
the ‘intellectual’ content change its identity? This question is deceptive. In the
analogue world changing the title of an object can have profound consequences.
Suppose the portrait of the Mona Lisa was in fact that of Thelma Arbuthnot
or using a digital analogy an arbitrary allocation such as WPM$5467, or that
Shakespeare’s play Hamlet was really called ‘Rosencrantz and Guildenstern
are dead’. This takes us into the deep waters of the relationship of naming
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conventions to objects in the analogue which have been explored by Barthes [4]
and Sontag [37] amongst others in relation to images, and which we will de-
velop in the digital context.
6 Rendition
In ‘Digital Identity Matters’ [1, pg. 367] we indicated that the language of
types and tokens is common within the discourse of aesthetics [40] and it is
from this domain that we developed our discussion.
“The type / token distinction has been utilised in order to distinguish art
forms with ‘unique’ objects, for example, sculpture and painting, from those
where there is no single unique object, for example, a play or a piece of music
that will have a multiplicity of performances. When we speak of Raoul
Dufy’s Trouville we refer to his 1907 composition using oil on canvas and
not to any of the many reproductions of the work. It is unique, even if it does
change over time due to deterioration of the paint or restoration, the type
from which the tokens or reproductions are derived. But the situation is not
always this straightforward. To begin with, types and tokens are slippery
characters that are not forever fixed as either type or token; thus a token
can become a type, and we might say of Nina Simone’s rendition of Feeling
Good that it is the definitive version and that any other rendition is a token
of that type. Secondly, we are not always dealing with physically unique
objects, Schubert’s Unfinished Symphony is not a physical object, though
we may want to argue that the original score is a physical manifestation of
it; and finally, we can see that the usual mental / physical divisions that
we use to categorise ‘objects’ are not always clearly appropriate when we
talk of performances or a digital image of something, perhaps, Lara Croft,
in virtual space.” 6
The experience that we have of any digital object is not a direct sensory expe-
rience of the object itself, but a performance choreographed by a combination
of hardware and software, fine-tuned by the settings on the computer in ques-
tion and the idiosyncrasies of computer, monitor and so forth. That being
the case, what each of us experiences in relation to a particular bit pattern
will probably be different, but does that mean that the experience of one of
us is ‘authentic’ whilst the others are being subjected to an inferior imita-
tion? If this were the case, it would make the sharing of digital objects very
problematic indeed and the presentation of any digital object as evidence in
court impossible. Manifestly, people share digital objects frequently and, for
6 a description of this computer game character can be found at http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Lara_Croft
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much of the time, do not suffer from this problem, even though the email that
is sent by one of us to the others is ‘experienced’ differently in the different
computing environments that we all use. Clearly what is important to us is
the ‘content’ of the digital object, be that an email, a draft of this paper, a
music track or a digital photograph.
In the analogue paper world, we developed ‘filters’ of varying sophistication,
depending on the context, to determine what was important in relation to
authenticity and what was not. The fact that we are able to accept a difference
in the ‘performance’ of digital objects on different systems suggests that we
have begun to develop ‘filters’ for digital information objects. A major problem
is that, for most of us, the grammar of these filters is not well developed and
this produces an opportunity for fraudsters who exploit the fact that, in the
on-line world, they can draw together elements from the web sites of financial
institutions and combine them with material of their own to produce digital
‘performances’ that appear to be authentic requests for security information,
but are in fact ‘phishing’ scams, a topic that we will return to later. 7 Such
filtering is beyond the boundary of ‘diplomatic’ and needs to be considered
within the framework of the interpretation of the ‘bindings’ that together
enable ‘truth enframing’.
A further issue is that many performances in the digital world are based
on dynamic assembly of information in response to the individual request.
The Wikipedia article referred to in the previous paragraph will probably be
different from that which is available to us at the time of writing by the time
that this article appears in print. It will probably be different again if you look
at it in another three months time. A more dynamic example of this scenario
exists when a Google search is carried out, where the results returned change
from minute to minute and so an instruction to ‘carry out a Google 8 search
for the words “digital performance” and then follow the link in the third item
returned’ is meaningless as there is little fixity in the object that is the result
of the search. This example, if repeated across searches via search engines,
databases and on-line forms, requires us to separate the identity of the query
from the identity of the result returned; the former may have a fixity, whilst
the latter may be unique to each search.
7 for a more detailed description of phishing, see for instance the Wikipedia article
at http://www.wikipedia.com/phishing/
8 http://www.google.com/
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7 Divergence of Versions
One of the important advantages of digital representation over analogue is
the ease with which objects can be changed. However, it also presents a con-
siderable challenge to the notion of identity that we use to determine and
re-identify an object over time and through change, particularly if we try to
apply analogue epistemology to the digital [16, pp. 49 & 98-9]. This isn’t nec-
essarily an issue of a plurality of meanings that we have already referred to,
though it is true that some changes can produce devastating alterations in
meaning: for example, the omission of ‘not’ in Terence’s phrase “Nothing is
said that has not been said before.”, or the mistranscription of ‘l’ in ‘life’ to
an ‘f’ in “Nothing in life is promised except death.”, which would surely give
rise to a population shift in Scotland. Perhaps we should ask if any and every
change that an object undergoes represents an identity change and, if so, how
do we effectively link together chains of modification and amendment into a
meta-level identity which permits the relationships to be characterised in a
such a way that we can trace a document’s progress as being D at time 1 (D
at T 1) and D at time n (D at T n)? If we remain for a moment in the analogue
world and consider the changes that exist between the early and later versions
of The Waste Land 9 , it would be hard to identify them as the same object,
unless under some less than rigorous, adaptive notion of identity. 10 Perhaps
a notion of an intransitive relation, of the kind suggested by Russell [32], in
which x stands in relation R to y, y stands in relation R to z, but the relation
xRz is excluded, that is, (xRy & yRz) → ¬xRz might do, though it is very
strong and a weaker version, where the relation xRz is not explicitly excluded
and (xRy & yRz) → ¬xRz is not implied, is more likely to be useful in this
and the class of similar problems we are likely to encounter.
The notions of identity, equivalence, transitivity and intransitivity are all im-
portant in a digital context because bit patterns may be rendered in any
number of ways without it being clear that the same bit pattern persists, or
that it is a different pattern of bits that is now being made to appear as a
previous but quite distinct pattern once did. Their representation by itself is
insufficient to establish their identity or discernibility. Once again we find our-
selves concerned with how the identity conditions for one object with another
can fail to be met at the level of the bit pattern, whilst remaining to be met
at the level of representation or appearance. [1]
9 A rendition of this poem may be found at: http://www.bartleby.com/201/1.
html
10One of the tragedies of the digital representation and facility for change is the
loss of a substantial record of amendments and revisions of the sort we have, for
example, in Pound’s work with Eliot all the way through the writing of The Waste
Land.
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With a domain of bit patterns D, which can be mapped using the action of
the technology b, onto a range of representations R, we get the statement:
b : D → R. If we now define equivalence as x ∼ x′ iff b(x) = b(x′), then
x′ ≈ x, where x, x′ ∈ D must also be equivalent and thus both symmetric and
transitive.
However, when bit pattern x is acted upon to produce bx, we have y and
not x. We can express this as x → bx = y, and having gone through this
transformation we now find that to regain x by b−1 would be impossible since
b−1 no longer exists. There is no way to go back to the previous state of x from
where we are now. The relationship is asymmetrical and intransitive, and it
would be clearly false to say of y that it is equivalent to x, for there are no
conditions under which we could effect y in any way so as to produce x, but
also, under our definition of equivalence, x and y would have to be members
of the same domain, and they are not.
There is no inverse of b. If there were some function c which maps R to D
such that c(b(x)) ∼ x, it would not imply that c(b(x)) = x. This leaves us
with a very curious state of affairs because c is not an inverse of b; it cannot
take us back to the bit pattern x. Which is to say that, as long as the set of
equivalent bit patterns has more than one member, the inverse function of b
will not be unique; the best you can do is find a function c which maps R
to D to give you something that is equivalent to the original x, though not –
except by some extraordinary chance – identical to it.
If we introduce the set (domain) of stylesheets (S), we can begin to see the
complexity of the situation a little more clearly. If b : D,S → R, 11 then
b(x, s1) → r1 ∈ R, b(x, s2) → r2 ∈ R, and so on. Which, even if it did entail
that x ∼ x′ iff b(x, s1) = b(x′, s1) would not necessarily entail that x ∼ x′ is
b(x, s2) = b(x
′, s2).
This state of affairs is not simply of academic interest. If digital objects lack
fixity in addition to being easily tampered with, how can they be used as
transactional evidence and what becomes of the bindings and associate filters
familiar in the analogue world?
8 Technical Transformations
Technical processes are applied to digital bit patterns to transform them into
different ones. Our interest is in (i) those that operate at a technical level on
the bit patterns and are agnostic about what sort of object it is, and (ii) those
11 This would more often be written as b : D ⊗ S → R.
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that work on the intellectual content of the object. So, there are two sorts of
transformations to consider:
• one-way, non-reversible transformations that produce a pseudo-identity which
is related in a defined way to the original bit pattern;
• two-way, reversible transformations that produce an object that, following
the reverse transformation, restore the original bit pattern.
8.1 One-way transformations
These are used to produce a ‘simplified’ object that can be used for some
purposes in place of the original. An example of a technical transformation is
a checksum or a hash. These can be used as a mechanism to detect technical
difference between bit patterns, and have the advantage of being very quick to
compute and use, but they are surrogates for one or more aspects of identity
and can be used to verify technical identity without engaging with the intel-
lectual identity of the object. An example is that law enforcement agencies
and employers can use lists of hashes of known child pornography objects to
screen systems rapidly in order to determine whether or not such objects are
present. This does not involve a human agent being required to view such ma-
terial at the screening stage. The hash provides a surrogate for the identity of
the file. An example of an ‘intellectual’ transformation is a transformation of
a media file that results in some loss of information by reducing the resolution
of an image or the sampling rate of a sound file. In both cases the result is
identifiably the same picture or song, but the non-reversible transformation
has resulted in the discard of some of the information content. Migration of
digital files from one format to another frequently involves this type of trans-
formation and is likely to be a feature of migration strategies used as part of
digital preservation activities [16, pp. 91-5] [30].
8.2 Two-way transformations
One important use of these is to produce a different object to hide the identity
of the original from people and/or systems. This type of transformation is usu-
ally referred to as encryption and is widely used by governments, individuals
and in commerce. What is the relationship between the original bit pattern,
the intellectual identity and the encrypted one? Clearly the encrypted identity
is not sufficient for recovery of the unencrypted one in that an additional key
is required for recovery, and organisations and individuals often find out to
their cost that without the key, they do not effectively have the intellectual
objects.
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Ideally digital preservation transformations would be of this type, but new
formats are rarely simply supersets of existing ones, rather they are better
considered as more or less closely overlapping sets. Manually checking that no
corruption or data loss had occurred would be impossible and, as we have seen,
cross checking automatically with the original could also not be guaranteed.
9 Composites
In the discussion of Divergence of Versions and Transformations above, we deal
with one area where the identity of an information object can be problematic
but which, as we have seen, presents similar difficulties in both the analogue
and digital domains, except that in the latter it may leave little or no trace. We
now turn to an issue that presents increasing difficulties in the digital world, as
tools are produced that facilitate it and technological developments blur the
distinctions: composite objects. At its simplest this involves combining two
existing texts to make a larger one, but the flexibility and creative possibility
offered by digital representation extends this into a wide variety of fields and in
particular written texts (the boundedness of which can be very fluid through
hyperlinks), composite images (easily modified with such tools as Photoshop 12
and Gimp 13 ) and digital objects where one intellectual object is hidden within
another.
Combining sources of information in a variety of ways such as through refer-
encing and footnotes has long made the boundary of an information object
slightly blurred. In an earlier paper we pointed out that:
“hypertext is an obvious way in which the bounds of digital objects become
eroded, however it is not a concept that originated in the digital world.
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, written in the trenches and
first published in 1922, uses a nesting of levels of argument that provide a
linking pattern that can be traced by the reader.” [6]
The hypertext world of the Web facilitates links and the seamless inclusion
of intellectual entities from one source into another. The resulting composite
has an identity of its own. The possibility of making one information object
very similar to another by replicating most of one object with a few ‘minor’
changes allows those intent on fraud or deception all the scope they desire.
We regularly receive e-mails from individuals or organisations attempting to
obtain our bank security details via phishing attacks – using ‘composite’ web
pages composed of material from a variety of sites including the ‘real’ bank web
12 http://www.adobe.com/products/photoshop/index.html
13 http://www.gimp.org
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site – that are intended to convince bank customers to divulge their security
details. Most of the links and images on such composite web pages point to
the real bank site and only a small number of page elements are actually
provided by the fraudsters in order to harvest personal details. Increasingly
such phishing expeditions appear to be authentic, but the content is not valid
in much the same way as a forged charter produced in a medieval monastery
is not authentic.
An important issue here is the intention to deceive. The artist Alison Jackson
produces fake composite photographs of well known people in order to raise
questions about whether or not the public perception of such figures has any
basis in reality: 14
“Hardly anyone knew Diana. Yet on her death the world mourned. They did
not mourn the woman, but her photographic image. We all think we know
David Beckham; thousands of fans have seen him in flesh on the pitch,
but millions of us only know him through his image. The same goes for
all celebrities, whether it’s Madonna, Prince William, or Tony Blair. The
result is that the photograph becomes more real than the actual person or
event. In my work I use celebrity look-alikes to create images which pose
fundamental questions about where the truth ends and the lies begin. The
line between what is real and what is fantasy has never been more blurred.
My photographs seek to explore the gap between the two and, if only for a
second, bring it sharply into focus.” [19]
In doing so she claims that she does not set out to deceive. On the other hand,
in his article on detecting fake digital photographs, Hany Farid describes the
impact of digital tampering and the development of mathematical and com-
putational algorithms to expose digital fakes, a task that becomes necessary
when there is an explicit intention to deceive or fabricate. [11] 15 These are
compelling examples of what we are getting at in the discussion of relationship
between the intellectual and technical that we described as techne´. A technical
analysis would draw no distinction between Jackson’s rationale for her work
and that of a fraudster.
We can develop this line of thought further. The question as to whether or not
a manufactured image depicting child sexual abuse or, perhaps slightly less
emotively, consensual pornography which depicts something that has never
happened are equivalent to images (doctored or otherwise) of abuse or pornog-
raphy that have taken place raises interesting intentional and legal issues. The
14 For an overview of Jackson’s work, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/weekend/
story/0,,1075094,00.html
15A range of examples of images doctored for a variety of purposes may be
found at Farid’s web site at: http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/farid/research/
digitaltampering/
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approach to this is not the same in all jurisdictions, a complicating factor
that applies more generally to much of this discussion and by its very nature
is dynamic. 16 In such circumstances it is important to distinguish between
‘real’ (undoctored) and manufactured images and the extent to which such
processes have taken place would perhaps have to rely largely on the technical
attributes of the digital objects themselves rather than intellectual identity.
The techniques discussed by Farid[11] are important in this situation, but a
doctored image is not the same as a completely ‘ficticious’ one, since in the
first case the person exists but in the second they may not; just like the dif-
ference between Jackson’s intention and fraud, this can only be distinguished
intellectually and not mechanistically.
Computing systems can create a view that is dynamically based on a search
of a database which may produce, for the user, an ‘object’ that has never been
viewed before and will never be viewed again. We see a particular instantiation
of this experience in the inclusion of ‘personalised’ advertisements as part of
the page when a user visits a web site. These advertisements are selected as
a result of earlier pages visited and cookies left in the browser. Pages viewed
will be different for different users, because although the main content is the
same, the advertisements are not. The LOCKSS (‘Lots of Copies Keep Stuff
Safe’) system, developed at Stanford University 17 to capture and archive e-
journals, has to distinguish journal content from ephemeral material such as
advertisements, site navigation and branding. This is achieved by constructing
technical filters known as ‘plug-ins’ that have to be programmed to identify
the ‘intellectual content’ of the journal for preservation purposes. Initially
such filters must be defined manually, based on the specific requirements of
e-journal archiving and the features of the particular e-journal publisher’s web
site.
A further twist in this discussion of composite information objects is the ca-
pability to encode one intellectual entity in another as in the case of steganog-
raphy where, for example, credit card details can be encoded within a digital
photograph (or other type of content) that is only detectable with a decod-
16 The 1996 US Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) extended the existing
federal criminal laws against child pornography to include certain types of “vir-
tual porn”. In 2002, hearing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the United States
Supreme Court found that portions of the CPPA, being overly broad and restric-
tive, violated First Amendment rights. The Court ruled that images containing an
actual minor or portions of a minor are not protected, while computer-generated im-
ages depicting a fictitious minor are constitutionally protected. In the UK however,
under the Protection of Children Act 1978, as amended by the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act 1994, a pseudo-photograph of a child is defined as an image,
whether made by computer graphics or otherwise. Possession or creation of such an
image is, therefore, illegal.
17 http://www.lockss.org/
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ing programme. This illustrates the idea that an information object is viewed
through the ‘lens of available technology’. A digital object viewed with simple
tools (or settings) may be perceived to have a different information content
than the same object viewed with a more sophisticated set of tools in the same
ways as the DNA LCN example. This means that the same digital object may
have different meaning for different people or at different times.
10 Where does this lead us?
Just like the pungent smell of a red herring, technology is beguiling to those
who have a liking for the chimera of wood smoke rather than what in the first
place made the wood, or the fish, and their respective aetiologies. We have
argued that it is not simply that technology should not dictate the approach
taken to the solution of identity but that it cannot. Technology per se does
not entail even the possibility of truth-framing which we deem necessary for
the determination of, those very problematic notions of, authenticity and val-
idation – notions that must be fit for a particular purpose and determined by
the user. Persistent identifiers, for example, are persistent only in their mode
of social use and cannot be adopted as a technological solution, even if one
were advisable.
As David Levy [2000] says:
In one current view, objects are at least in part socially constructed; they
are bounded and stabilised through social interaction (Smith 1996[36]). Lit-
erary works (e.g., Hamlet) are a clear example of this. Although we cannot
really say what works are, we have nonetheless created a cultural mechanism
(copyright and the courts) to help us decide where the boundaries between
works lie. Here there can be no question of ultimate, natural answers–only
social answers based on law and politics.[22]
Whilst few writers make a strong assertion that identity is purely a tech-
nical issue, some do by either omission or implication or, as in the case of
Negroponte[29], both. 18 Much discussion around the use of both digital sig-
natures and persistent identities sounds rather techno-deterministic[12]. 19 In
18 In Being Digital Negroponte talks a great deal about technology but does not
discuss the identity of the objects except in describing bits as ‘The DNA of Infor-
mation’, which is to adopt a very techno-representational perspective.
19 Contrast, for example, Sign here! : handwriting in the age of the new media [28],
with the Wikipedia entry on digital signature at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Digital_signature, the report commissioned by the Nation Library of Australia
at: http://www.nla.gov.au/nla/staffpaper/2001/dack.html, or the report on
the DCC Workshop on Persistent Identifiers available at:
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summarising discussions on Authenticity in a Digital Environment in 2000
at the Council on Library and Information Resources, Abby Smith used this
description in relation to using Public Key Infrastructures as the answer:
To devise technical solutions to what is essentially a social challenge is to
engender an “arms race” among hackers and their police.[35]
Although a brand is applied using a technology, such as a hot brand iron, the
mark itself is nothing more than a social construct. Even if biometrics as a
brand are collected, these only support a socially agreed identifier, a personal
name. The inevitable consequence of the adoption of an arbitrary reference,
one not concerned with the preservation of the intellectual content, will be an
under-application of pra¯xis and potentially a failure in binding.
If, as we claim, technology does not provide the answer to identity problems,
then we need to look at how these cultural mechanisms or social practices
provide us with a way forward. One way of doing this is to look backward
at the analogue world with which we are all rather more familiar, at the
practices that have built up around the storage of information just as pigment
marks on paper have developed over several hundred years. In this matter we
are preceded by almost a millennium in the science of diplomatics that was
developed in response to the widespread forging of documents in the Middle
Ages. 20
Authenticity in the paper world is about much more than the technology
that represents the document, it is about the structure, form, content and
context of the document. In the digital world it is the same, but we have yet
to establish many of the social practices and conventions that are required
to deal with the distinct lack of fixity in such a world. Records management
has much to teach us in relation to verifiable reference through file plans that
are external to the document, retention periods and file registries. These are
all social practices that organisations have simply abandoned in the digital
world as unnecessary, but roles and responsibilities for particular actions and
practices are an important part of establishing a digital order where there is
verifiable identity and Duranti [9] is right to say that we have much to learn,
in this respect, from the past.
As we have seen, there can be no guarantee that the intellectual content will be
maintained if we rely entirely on technological referents without any consider-
ation of the sense of the text and its reference in their particular contexts. For
this reason we must learn from known practice and procedure in the analogue
world with its well-defined rules that make binding an explicit consequence.
http://www.ariadne.ac.uk/issue44/dcc-pi-rpt/ .
20A very good account of the history of diplomatics can be found in the Ency-
clopaedia Britannica Online article by, the very well-regarded, Peter Herde[17].
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Such an approach directly addresses the notion that identity of the object,
no matter what the object’s format, is dynamic with changes that can be
mapped in the form of intransitive relations at every stage of its persistence
and relationships, which may or may not be intransitive. 21
To pervert John Donne ‘no document is an island’ 22 or as Day puts it ‘in-
formation is not neutral and not without expression; information is produced
by a relation of bodies in and as space’ [7]. Content must not be dismissed in
favour of technology since technology can never resolve the semantics of dy-
namic relationships.. The intellectual contents of documents can change over
time without there being any necessary change in the technology used to ren-
der them. For example, the definition of the term ’bill of rights’ in a stable
print culture has changed repeatedly since it was coined in the late eighteenth
century. There can be changes of technology which do not necessitate corre-
sponding changes of content, for example, from writing to printing or from
analogue to digital photography. However since it is content that is our funda-
mental concern, we must not concentrate on technology-driven solutions at the
expense of the only thing about which questions of truth and validity are apt.
Printing and the Internet make it possible to provide greater access to knowl-
edge, but they do nothing to resolve the fundamental questions that depend
on intellectual endeavour. Johann Gutenburg may have contributed to the
great religious upheaval of the sixteenth century known as the Reformation,
but he did not cause it; no more did Tim Berners-Lee cause globalisation.
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